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Introduction: The Story of Sal
I would like to tell you about a fellow named Sal. Don’t worry; I made 
him up.1 But imagine he is real.
Sal is a 60-year-old white male. He is slightly overweight, is borderline 
diabetic, and smokes half a pack per day. But otherwise Sal is in good 
health. Aside from minor ailments, Sal has never been very sick. Sal’s 
doctor periodically advises him to lose weight, take medication for his 
diabetes, and stop smoking, but Sal has always felt ﬁne.
Increasingly, however, Sal feels chest pain when walking up stairs or 
running to catch the subway. After some nagging, Sal visits his primary 
care physician. The doctor suspects angina and refers Sal to a cardiolo-
gist, who does a variety of tests. The results are not great. Sal has prob-
able heart disease. 
Cardiac catheterization, a procedure to measure how well blood ﬂows 
to the heart, is performed. Signiﬁcant narrowing is detected in one of the 
arteries supplying blood to Sal’s heart. A heart attack won’t happen next 
week, but will in the next few years. The cardiologist recommends angio-
plasty, a procedure to open the clogged artery and insert a mesh tube to 
keep it open. The procedure is successful, and the artery is reopened. 
Fortunately, insurance pays the $20,000 bill. 
The cardiologist sends Sal back to the primary care physician, along 
with some recommendations: nitrate pills for periods of intensive pain; 
aspirin and beta blockers as well; more regular use of diabetes medica-
tion; absolutely no smoking; switch to non-fat milk instead of whole 
milk; use salt only in moderation; and exercise regularly.
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Sal has the best of intentions. He starts taking the medications more 
regularly, and switches to a salt substitute. After years of his wife’s entreat-
ies, he ﬁnally gives up cigarettes. He walks 30 minutes a day, three times 
a week, for two weeks. But life soon catches up. The medication needs 
reﬁlling, and there is no time. Sal’s weight, which fell at ﬁrst, increases 
again. It is hard to exercise in winter, Sal tells himself; when the weather 
is nicer, he’ll begin the exercise program.
Come time for his annual physical, Sal feels ashamed of his lack of 
progress. He grudgingly goes to the doctor a half-year later than he 
should. The doctor repeats the unfollowed advice. Sal again tries to com-
ply. Walking is resumed and red meat consumption is lowered, at least for 
a time. Medications are back in use. But old habits are hard to break. In 
just a few months, most of the progress is gone. This cycle continues for 
a few years: recommendations are given, acted on for a while, and then 
discarded. Sal’s visits to his doctor become progressively less regular.
Five years later, Sal pays the price. He has a massive heart attack. Sal 
is rushed to the hospital and stabilized. Bypass surgery is performed two 
days later, at a cost of $50,000 (thank God for insurance!). The surgery 
keeps Sal alive, but there are complications. Sal’s heart doesn’t pump that 
well anymore, and ﬂuid builds up in his lungs. Over the next three years, 
Sal is in and out of hospitals with pneumonia, heart, and respiratory 
complications. At age 68, Sal dies.
Did Sal Receive Good Care?
Considering everything, how do we evaluate this story? Did Sal receive 
good or bad medical care? Could things have gone better? If so, how? 
Since this is a participatory conference, I want to take a survey. How 
many of you believe that Sal received good medical care? How many 
believe that Sal received bad medical care? I would say about three-quar-
ters believe that he received good medical care, and one-quarter say that 
he received bad medical care. 
Sal is interesting because he shows how the medical system works—the 
good and the bad. I want to use this case as an example of the kinds of 
things that go right and wrong to illustrate the challenges that Cathy 
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The correct answer is that Sal received both good and bad medical 
care. All the medical procedures that Sal received, if I understand cor-
rectly what my physician friends have told me, were appropriate. They 
either alleviated the immediate symptoms or they saved his life. Angio-
plasty alleviated his immediate symptoms, bypass surgery saved his life, 
and the medication and lifestyle recommendations he was given were 
appropriate. This is state-of-the-art medical care. 
But was it worth it? Did the beneﬁts exceed the costs? The golden rule 
of economics is that you do something if the beneﬁts are greater than the 
costs. In this case, if you consider the time when Sal had his heart attack, 
the costs are the up-front treatment, including all those spiffy things that 
he got in the hospital, plus the downstream costs of caring for him after 
he survived. The primary beneﬁt is the expectation of longer and higher 
quality of life. There is also a personal dimension: whether people were 
satisﬁed with the care they received. Finally, there are some ﬁnancial 
implications that may be either positive or negative. In this case, they are 
mostly negative. For example, keeping Sal alive means that he collects 
Social Security and other beneﬁts. So these costs represent a reduction for 
everybody else in the amount of money (resources) they have for goods 
and services, and these costs offset the beneﬁts to him and to us of Sal’s 
living a longer life.
Totaling up the beneﬁts and the costs, the balance sheet looks as shown 
in Table 3.1, below:
Table 3.1
Beneﬁts and Costs of Sal’s Treatment
Beneﬁts Costs
•  Expectation of longer and higher- 
•  quality of life
•  Patient/family satisfaction with care
•  Financial implications for others of  
•  keeping a person alive and/or  
•  healthy
•  Upfront treatment costs (tPA,  
•  aspirin, primary angioplasty, beta  
•  blockers, etc.)
•  Downstream treatment costs
•  Financial implications for others of  
•  keeping a person alive and/or  
•  healthy
•  Other downstream costs
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We can think about asking whether care is worth it or not in the case 
of Sal—or in the case of the medical system as a whole—by trying to 
take account of the costs and the beneﬁts of care. Sal’s case is actually 
emblematic of the medical system as a whole.
Weighing the Evidence: The Net Gain from Recent Medical Advances 
The discussion below is based on a decade of research on changes in 
treatment standards over the past half-century in three important areas: 
cardiovascular disease, low-birth-weight babies, and care for the men-
tally ill. Many more details can be found in my recent book, Your Money 
or Your Life (Cutler 2004).
Changes in Medical Care for Severe Heart Disease
If you go back a couple of decades, to, say, 1950—Sal’s therapy would 
have been bed rest. The 1950 standard of care for severe heart disease 
(myocardial infarction, or MI) was bed rest for six months or more. So 
rather than getting all those fancy procedures in the hospital, they would 
have put him in bed for at least six months. The direct cost of this care 
was minimal (although the opportunity cost to the patient and his family 
may have been high). One can think about other costs, like the fact that 
the person is not working and that he is perhaps supported through some 
other programs. Conceptually, I include the reduced value of transfer 
payments on the beneﬁt side. Here, I just want to think about the medi-
cal costs. 
In contrast, the 2000 standard of care for MI involves technologies 
such as thrombolytics and revascularization—procedures whose direct 
cost is high. Just to give you a sense of the magnitude, the direct cost of 
cardiovascular disease care per 45-year-old rose from about $0 to about 
$30,000 in present value terms over the last half of the twentieth century. 
The reason we spend more in caring for heart disease today than in the 
1950s and 1960s is that we do more. And that is true across the board. 
As Cathy Minnehan mentioned, medical spending currently represents 
15 percent of the economy. It’s going to be 18 percent. And the reason for 
this is that we can do more.51 David M. Cutler
Changes in Medical Care for Low-Birth-Weight Infants
The 1950 standard for treating low-birth-weight infants was to use the 
ﬁrst generation of incubators and to experiment with warming and other 
intuitive actions. These treatments were available at a very low cost. But 
again, they were not very effective. In 2000, low-birth-weight infants can 
be treated in sophisticated neonatology units, employing ventilators and 
artiﬁcial “surfactant.”2 These treatments are quite costly: the cost per 
low-birth-weight infant rose from about $0 in 1950 to about $70,000 
in 2000.
Changes in Medical Care for People Suffering from Depression
The 1950 standard of care for people suffering from depression involved 
institutionalization in a mental hospital for the very ill, with very little 
care for those with milder symptoms. Procedures for treating the severely 
ill in institutions included lobotomy, electroconvulsive therapy, and insu-
lin therapy. Two of those, thankfully, have been laid to rest. The 2000 
standard for treating depression includes selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs), antidepressants, and advances in psychotherapy such 
as cognitive behavior therapy and other techniques. The advances in 
treatment options for depression over the past half-century enable more 
people to be treated more effectively. However, as a price to be paid for 
this progress, spending on depression has doubled in the past 20 years, as 
many more people are diagnosed with depression than were in the past.
Net Gains
One cares not just about what is spent, but about the return on spending. 
As I said, there are a number of components to this reform. The most 
important is how long a person lives. In this case, Sal probably lived 
about ﬁve years longer because he had the care, much of it of reasonably 
good quality. Actually, there’s a whole industry of people who go out and 
measure the length of life and quality of life. Let me tell you a little about 
what they have found.
As Figure 3.1 shows, cardiovascular disease mortality has declined by 
over 50 percent since 1950. Put in terms of years of life, the average 45-
year-old will live another four and one-half years because cardiovascular 
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disease mortality has declined. Several factors have been important in this 
trend, among them the marked decline in mortality rates that followed 
the release of the Surgeon General’s report on the dangers of smoking, 
the wide adoption of anti-hypertension medications, and the spread of 
invasive technologies to treat cardiovascular disease. My estimate is that 
about two-thirds of the increase in longevity—or roughly three years 
of increased life—results from medical intervention, with most of the 
remainder due to smoking cessation.
Let me now combine the costs and beneﬁts of medical care. Since 1950, 
we have spent about $30,000 per 45-year-old and obtained in return 
about three years of longer life. And so your second quiz question is, 
is it worth it? The correct answer is, yes, it is worth it. In case you’re 
wondering, the present value of the beneﬁts calculated by a methodology 
I won’t go through—it will be familiar to most of the economists here 
and is based on valuing risks to life and using that information to infer 
the value of traditional life years—is about $120,000, yielding a rate of 
return of four to one. Let me know when banks start paying that return 
on their deposits, and I will sign right up. Indeed, when you look at quite 
Figure 3.1
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a number of medical interventions, they have beneﬁts that are substan-
tially greater than the costs, as Figure 3.2 shows.
What is going on in Figure 3.2 is that people value their health highly; 
two-thirds of Americans rank health care as a top item for an expanding 
economy. Most Americans are willing to pay the equivalent of $100,000 
to save a year of life. Most of us have enough money to provide for the 
basics in life: food, clothing, shelter, and basic medical care. And so, as 
we get richer, we want to extend the quantity and improve the quality of 
our lives. Medical advance costs a lot, but is worth it. That is why the 
“R” word (rationing) cannot be uttered in polite company in the United 
States.
Let me come back to the big picture. Why do we spend more now on 
medical care? In part because we are well insured, and in part because the 
technology is worth it. Now, that does not mean we can afford to keep 
doing it; but as an approximate matter, what is going on with medical 
spending is that we spend a lot more because we get a lot more. At least 
Figure 3.2
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by my estimation, on the whole it is worth it. So, Sal, and we, as a whole, 
are actually doing fairly well. Why shouldn’t we spend our money on 
being healthier?
The Glass Is Half-Empty
Sal: The Sad Part of the Story
So, that’s the good side. The bad side is what was not done for Sal. 
Although medical care bought Sal years of life, many things that should 
have been done were not. No one followed up on his adherence over 
time to the recommended lifestyle changes. This, too, is state-of-the-art 
medicine. No one helped Sal with medications, side effects, or any other 
complicated issue of managing disease. 
Consider poor old Sal. He was told, “Change your life.” So, here he is, 
a 60-year-old man who all his life has been obese and has not taken care 
of himself. He goes to the doctor and the doctor says, “You know what, 
Sal? You really ought to make these major lifestyle improvements. Why 
don’t you go away and do that?” Well, of course, he’s going to have dif-
ﬁculty doing that. Every one of us has difﬁculty doing that. Next week, 
I’m giving up cookies. I promise. So, the single biggest problem in Sal’s 
story is that Sal’s chronic disease was not well controlled. We could have 
saved a lot of money, at least in the short term, and extended his life by 
many years, had we controlled it better. 
We Know We Can Do Better
What would good prevention look like? I will give you just one example, 
that of HealthPartners, an HMO in Minneapolis that decided a few years 
ago that it was going to focus on improved care for diabetics like Sal. The 
primary components of diabetes management programs are the dissemi-
nation of guidelines, provider education, member education, screening 
programs, performance feedback to physicians, patient reminders, case 
management, and at-risk lists. The HMO went to the doctors and said, 
“We’re going to give you proﬁles of how well your diabetic patients are 
doing compared with other doctors’ diabetic patients. Then we’re going 
to contact the patients and make sure they come in, to see whether they 
are taking their medications and, if they are not, why not.” This is not 55 David M. Cutler
very intensive stuff. Still, the HMO showed signiﬁcant improvements in 
the care for diabetics, all as a result of low-tech care. This is not inventing 
a spiffy new way to treat people once they have kidney failure. This is 
ﬁguring out ways to get people to do what’s best for them. A study of the 
outcomes of this program showed a dramatic decline in patients’ mean 
HbA1c levels3 from 1994, when the program began, to 2000 (see Figure 
3.3 below).
There are other similar examples—Kaiser Permanente in California, 
for instance—where people have shown that it is, in fact, possible to do 
much better in managing chronic disease. 
The real question is, why is Sal’s case so typical? Why isn’t more 
being done to control chronic disease? My answer is: money. The kinds 
of information technology that you would need in order to work with 
patients are not reimbursed at all. There’s no reimbursement for anything   
other than a doctor seeing a patient. Take the simplest example: what 
share of doctors communicate regularly by email with their patients? I 
can email virtually everybody in my life with the exception of my doctor. 
The share of doctors who communicate regularly with their patients by 
Figure 3.3
Improvement in Diabetes Management from Low-Tech Care at HealthPartners, 
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email is 3 percent, which is smaller than the share of priests who are on 
email. I think it’s even smaller than the share of people who communicate 
with the Lord by email.
And, by the way, if you ask any doctor why they don’t communicate 
via email, the reason is because they are not paid for it. I once knew an 
HMO that was trying to ﬁgure out whether it could set up email for only 
those employers that agreed to pay for it, even though there was no addi-
tional cost to provide it to everybody.
One result is that we spend a lot more than we need to on people when 
they get sick. We also substitute intensive care for lifestyle chronic disease 
care. If you ask, “What is the single biggest difference between care in, 
say, the United States and care in Canada?” the answer would probably be 
that in the United States, Sal got his angioplasty when he was feeling chest 
pain; while in Canada, they would have told him to take his statin drug, 
exercise more, and try to lose weight. The net results are that our health 
care system is much more expensive than Canada’s. Both could be effective. 
Indeed, if you look at Jack Wennberg’s work at Dartmouth (Wennberg, 
Fisher, and Skinner, 2002), areas of the country that spend more don’t 
have sicker patients going in, and probably don’t have healthier patients 
coming out—although I must admit, I’m a bit less convinced of that—and, 
on the whole, don’t have more satisﬁed patients. What happens when you 
spend more is that doctors do more. Sometimes, it is needless stuff, that 
is, testing that doesn’t need to happen; at other times, it is substituting 
intensive testing for lifestyle changes that people could make.
The net impact is mixed. Figure 3.4 shows the division of medical care 
along two axes: should the care be provided—a statement about whether 
the care has beneﬁts greater than costs—and whether the care is pro-
vided. The happy situations are where appropriate care is provided and 
inappropriate care is not provided.
Unfortunately, what we get is too much of the other boxes. In Figure 
3.4, those other boxes represent the two kinds of mistakes that are made. 
The box on the top right represents things that are done that should not 
be done. This includes intensive procedures that are used when simpler 
interventions would do, and unnecessary testing that happens because 
doctors are paid for it. There are different guesses as to how much money 
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at Dartmouth says it is 30 percent. My colleague Michael Porter at Har-
vard Business School thinks it is even higher (Porter and Teisberg 2006). 
There’s a fair amount of money in there. And, this does not even include 
administrative expenses. This is just medical care that is provided, but is 
probably not doing much good beyond what we could accomplish other-
wise. So, you could save that 20 percent, at least.
On the other hand, there is the bottom-left quadrant, where things that 
should be done are not being done. Nobody has a great guess as to what 
it would cost to do these things. My own personal guess is that we could 
spend about 10 percent more on medicine by, for example, dealing better 
with Sal and his chronic disease. What would that involve? Having him 
come to the doctor, get tests, and take medication. Similarly, uninsured 
people should get more care. After all, if we didn’t want them to get 
more care, why would we want them to have insurance? My rough guess 
is that if we waved a magic wand and started doing all the right things, 
and stopped doing all the needless ones, we might save about 10 percent 
of our medical care spending on a net basis, but we would actually have 
remarkably improved health.
Getting to the Promised Land: Three Strategies
So, how do we get there? The Holy Grail of health care reform is cost, 
access, and quality. People want costs to be lower, access to be higher, and 
quality to be better. And so, how does one deal with this analysis that sug-
gests that while we are doing pretty well on the whole, there are some very 
Figure 3.4
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gross errors? There are three strategies that are out there. I will try to give 
you a very brief overview of them and tell you a bit about how I lean. 
The ﬁrst strategy is consumer-directed health care, which entails mak-
ing health care more of a market. This strategy includes greater cost shar-
ing, more information provision, and related interventions. This solution 
comes out of the literature that worries a lot about the overuse of medi-
cal care. And, indeed, everything that we know from the RAND Health 
Insurance experiment (Newhouse et al. 1993) suggests that increasing 
cost sharing by people will lead to less use of care, and that would be 
good on the overuse dimension. What people worry about is whether 
this will exacerbate the problem of underused care. When people give up 
care, who is to say that the care that is saved is only the low-valued care? 
Some evidence suggests that it is not (Huskamp et al. 2003).
The second strategy is the single-payer system: lower fees, restrictions 
on what is done, and lower administrative expense. This approach is 
also, to a great extent, designed to address the issue of care overuse, since 
the United States spends more on health care than other countries do. 
But will the single-payer approach do anything on the prevention side? 
Most of the evidence we have from other countries—some of them sin-
gle-payer—is that they actually don’t do much better on prevention than 
the United States does. All medical systems are geared towards high-tech 
treatment. Some just do more of it, while others do less of it. So, I worry 
that health would not improve in a single-payer system.
The third broad direction is payment reform—paying for performance, 
not quantity. This strategy is primarily designed to address underused 
care, by paying doctors to do things that they ought to do. The primary 
concern that people have with respect to this strategy is: will it actually 
save money or will it just lead to more care, and will providers game this 
system in some way? There is enormous debate about this, which other 
speakers will address. My personal belief is that this is the best way to go, 
since both underuse and overuse are signiﬁcant problems.
I cannot resist ending on a cautionary note. In the past few decades, 
there have been any number of “magic cures” for health care. The pro-
spective payment system was going to be great. Managed care was going 
to be great. Provider integration was going to be great. Provider disinte-
gration was going to be great. Having insurers provide medical care was 59 David M. Cutler
going to save the world. Having providers and insurers be separate was 
going to solve our problems. We have gone through various fads, and we 
need to be cautious about all of these ideas. In fact, this is where I want to 
leave things: in the religious world, they have been searching for the Holy 
Grail for 2,000 years. In health care, we have only been searching for 100 
years, so we have quite a way to go. That is not to say we shouldn’t try 
these approaches, but just to say that we should be a bit skeptical about 
our ability to work wonders.
Notes
1.  For the curious, Salus is the Roman god of health.
2. “Surfactant” is a ﬂuid secreted by the cells of the alveoli (the tiny air sacs in 
the lungs) that serves to reduce the surface tension of pulmonary ﬂuids and thus 
keep the lung from collapsing. 
3. The test measures the amount of glycosylated hemoglobin (hemoglobin mol-
ecules that have become chemically linked to glucose) in the blood. The test gives 
a good estimate of how well diabetes is being managed over time.
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Health economists, led by David Cutler, have brought into question the 
long-held proposition that most of the increases in health care spending 
consist of waste and inefﬁciency. Cutler makes a strong case that, on 
average, the growth in spending has been used to purchase care whose 
value exceeds the value of the outlays. Advances in medical technology 
and knowledge have produced these gains. At the same time, it is widely 
acknowledged that the U.S. health care system operates some distance 
from its efﬁciency frontier. The point of departure for economists seeking 
to address such issues is to consider the traditional incentive problems 
in health insurance markets that stem from adverse selection and moral 
hazard, which are clearly important. 
However, rapid increases in medical spending and dissatisfaction with 
quality of care appear to be nearly universal in Western nations that 
operate under vastly different health care rationing arrangements. David 
Cutler’s analysis of health care delivery in the United States consists of 
two main parts. The ﬁrst assesses empirically whether, on average, the 
gains in health over time are comparable in value to the rise in spending 
on medical care that has produced them. The second part begins with an 
acknowledgment that we are unlikely to be on the efﬁciency frontier and 
argues for a “pay-for-performance” approach to improving health care 
delivery in the United States. In this essay, I focus on a few behaviors 
related to medical decision-making that may help to explain why the 
health care system operates at some distance from the efﬁciency frontier. 
I also concentrate on aspects of the psychology of decision-making that 
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may be important to the design of pay-for-performance schemes. My aim 
is not to provide a comprehensive review of issues, but rather to highlight 
a few fundamental ideas from behavioral economics that may offer some 
insights beyond those provided by the traditional mode of health eco-
nomics analysis regarding why the health care delivery system performs 
the way it does.1
My remarks are organized into three additional sections. First, I offer 
a cursory review of the performance of the U.S. health care delivery sys-
tem. Second, I identify two behavioral economics concepts that may have 
particularly strong power to explain some of the observed patterns of 
performance: “status quo bias” and “unrealistic optimism.” I then apply 
a third idea from behavioral economics that is related to some proposed 
supply-side remedies to the cost and quality problem: the “psychologi-
cal response to complex pricing schemes.” The ﬁnal section of the paper 
offers some concluding observations. 
 Health Care Spending and Value 
The United States spent roughly $1.99 trillion or 16 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) on health care in 2005.2 Health care spend-
ing is also growing at an annual rate of 7.8 percent, a rate that is 2.7 
percentage points higher than the rate of growth in GDP for that period 
(5.1 percent). These trends are a return to historical patterns that were 
interrupted brieﬂy during the late 1990s (1996 to 1999), the era of man-
aged care. The popular press and many policy analysts view the growth 
in health care spending as unsustainable. Students of the federal budget 
note that the share of the federal budget accounted for by health expen-
ditures, currently about 16 percent, is expected to rise to 21 percent in 
2017, and will equal the size of all current federal outlays by the year 
2070 (CBO 2007, Table 3-1). 
David Cutler and others have noted that deciding whether health spend-
ing is too low or too high requires considering the value of what health 
expenditures purchase (Cutler 2004). Dramatic advances in medical sci-
ence have produced cures where none previously existed—treatments 
that allow people to function effectively in society where previously they 63 Richard G. Frank
would have been disabled and dependent, as well as procedures that can 
be administered in a physician’s ofﬁce that would have required many 
days in a hospital just a few years ago. Thus, the technical frontier of 
medicine has expanded enormously over the past 20 years. Cutler’s anal-
ysis uses changes over time in medical spending and health outcomes 
to assess whether the gains in health have been worth the extra outlays 
on health services. Using case studies on infant health, cardiovascular 
disease, and depression, he offers persuasive evidence that average pro-
ductivity of spending on medical care has been rising. This is very impor-
tant because it has shifted the debate from the idea that most additional 
medical care spending in the United States stems from price increases and 
produces little in the way of increased health. 
Cutler’s insights have encouraged other analyses that point in similar 
directions. For example, Thorpe and colleagues decompose the source of 
expenditure growth for the 15 medical conditions that account for the 
highest rates of nominal growth in health care spending (Thorpe, Flor-
ence, and Joski 2004). They decompose changes in spending into changes 
in the cost per treated case, number of cases treated, and population 
(growth and composition). For 7 of the top 15 conditions, they show that 
changes in treated disease prevalence account for 40 percent or more of 
the increase in spending, an indication that more people are getting some 
treatment for important illnesses. In addition, for several of the disease 
categories for which spending growth is being driven by the cost per case, 
there is evidence of important gains in health outcomes; this is the case 
with heart disease, as discussed by Cutler. 
 Cutler’s analysis recognizes features of health care delivery that sug-
gest inefﬁciency. He notes a variety of troubling reports that suggest that 
the health care system does not operate on the technical frontier and 
that there is, in fact, a great deal of poor quality in American health 
care (Institute of Medicine 2001; McGlynn et al. 2003). Research has 
also established that there is vast variation in the costs of providing 
health care to various patient populations located in different regions of 
the country. For example, in 1999, it cost 103 percent more to provide 
health care to Medicare beneﬁciaries living in Miami than to those in 
Minneapolis. The difference cannot be accounted for by demographic   
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differences, health care prices, or health status (Wennberg and Cooper 
1997). Together, these reports suggest that the health sector does not 
produce on the production frontier and often does not minimize the cost 
of producing health or health improvements. 
 What Cutler’s analysis does not say is either (1) how health care is 
not efﬁcient, or (2) whether efﬁciency is improving over time. This then 
leaves open questions of how one might want to change the organiza-
tion and ﬁnancing of health care. Cutler’s prescription for improving the 
value of health care spending or efﬁciency is based on his observation 
that health care payment systems in the United States do not typically 
reward the outcomes that we want. Hence, he sees pay-for-performance 
(P4P) schemes as a step towards paying for the kinds of outcomes that 
efﬁciency dictates and Americans want. Cutler is not alone in his enthu-
siasm for P4P. There has been a recent rush by payers to implement such 
policies (Rosenthal et al. 2004; Institute of Medicine 2007). I believe 
that it is worth stepping back to consider how doctors make decisions 
and whether the “rationality” that is behind P4P is present to a sufﬁ-
cient degree to warrant the current enthusiasm. This raises two speciﬁc   
questions: 
(1) If physicians are rational and money oriented, how do they respond 
to P4P schemes? 
(2) If physicians are not entirely rational and money oriented, how do 
they respond to P4P schemes? 
Below, I focus mainly on the second question and leave most of the ﬁrst 
question for another time. 
Inertia, Optimism, and Complexity 
In this section, I concentrate on the inertia of professionals, or what has 
been termed status quo bias in decision-making and unrealistic opti-
mism by professionals, in the context of a highly complex and uncer-
tain decision-making environment. I will also examine the psychology 
of responses to complex payment environments. These concepts will be 
applied to help explain the inefﬁciency in health care delivery and the 
possible difﬁculties with P4P as a remedy. 65 Richard G. Frank
Inertia or Status Quo Bias 
Thaler has identiﬁed a general tendency of people to exaggerate the value 
of an item they possess (selling price) relative to how they would value 
the same item if they did not own it (buying price) (Thaler 1980). This 
has been termed the “endowment effect.” Samuelson and Zeckhauser 
make some related observations regarding the tendency of people to 
exaggerate their preference for the current state of affairs (Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser 1988). This occurs in the context of more complex cir-
cumstances (choices over multiple goods or complicated attributes) and 
has been termed status quo bias. These apparent anomalies in decision-
making have been linked to reference points and strong loss aversion. A 
number of experimental studies have provided evidence that status quo 
bias occurs under a variety of circumstances in which decisions are made 
under uncertainty. 
For example, a test of status quo bias was conducted among electric 
power consumers in California. Consumers were asked to indicate their 
preferences over different combinations of service reliability and rates. 
The respondents came from one of two groups, one with much more reli-
able services than the other. Each group was asked to indicate preferences 
over six service-rate combinations, where one was the status quo. The 
results showed that 60.2 percent of the high-reliability group chose the 
status quo, and 5.7 percent chose the low-reliability option, which came 
with a 30 percent decline in rates. In the low-reliability group, 58 percent 
chose the status quo, and 5.8 percent selected the high-reliability option, 
which came with a 30 percent increase in rates (Hartman, Doane, and 
Woo 1991). The results suggest that people are reluctant to adopt a new 
service or to even-handedly evaluate new choices. 
The departure of everyday medical practice from recommended evi-
dence-based medical practice has been widely documented. A recent 
study examined the quality of care for 30 chronic and acute conditions 
as well as for some preventive practices (McGlynn et al. 2003, Note 3). 
They found that, overall, people seeking care received about 55 percent 
of recommended care. Many of these practices have been recognized for 
some time in published research and by professional medical societies 
as forming the basis of high-quality treatment. A recent example of off-
frontier production was examined by Skinner and Staiger who found 
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that economic incentives and budgets did not explain departures from 
frontier production (Skinner and Staiger 2005). Thus, the advances in 
medical treatment techniques that Cutler and others identify as driving 
the health system to deliver more health care also require physicians and 
other providers of medical care (hospitals and nurses) to modify treat-
ment approaches that in numerous cases appear to have met with success 
for many years. In other words, these advances require providers to alter 
the status quo. The puzzle for economists is that the “costs” of adopting 
these new practices are generally quite low for physicians, while the pros-
pects for improving health outcomes are quite high. Why, then, would 
professionals focused on treating the ailments of those who are most 
often well-insured people not adopt these new practices? 
In the context of medical decision-making and studies of diffusion of 
medical knowledge and practice, status quo bias may offer a foundation 
for developing a new model that explains the tendency of medical prac-
tice to cling to older methods of treatment. Prescription drug decisions 
furnish an important choice to study this issue. Since physicians generally 
do not gain ﬁnancially based on the drugs they choose, one would expect 
them to behave as “perfect agents.” For example, physicians have been 
shown to favor pharmaceutical products that they were introduced to in 
medical training even if newer products have been shown to be superior 
(Scherer 2000). One recent study conducted in Germany examined the 
characteristics of psychiatrists most likely to adopt the new generation of 
anti-psychotic medications. The analysis found that the age of the psy-
chiatrist (as a marker of how long he or she had been in practice) was the 
most important variable explaining the adoption of the new drugs. Patient 
characteristics had no signiﬁcant effect on prescribing patterns (Haman 
et al. 2004). Hellerstein (1998) studied a very simple decision, whether to 
prescribe a generic drug, using U.S. data from 1989. She found that most 
of the variation in the prescribing of generics was unexplained by patient, 
price (insurance), and regulatory factors. As in other research, she found 
that older physicians were less likely to prescribe generic products than 
were younger physicians. These studies offer evidence on patterns of pre-
scribing that are consistent with status quo bias. 
The implication of status quo bias in medical decision-making is that, 
while innovation in medical care will result in improved health outcomes 
over time, even at levels where the beneﬁts exceed the incremental expen-67 Richard G. Frank
ditures, the distance between average practice and the efﬁciency frontier 
can be substantial and will grow ever larger during times of accelerating 
innovation. In terms of consequences for P4P, status quo bias will likely 
attenuate any response relative to what one might expect from a “purely” 
rational, money-oriented doctor. It also implies that the rewards needed 
to “move practice” may be larger than expected. 
Unrealistic Optimism
People tend to be overconﬁdent. Studies of drivers and entering students 
all suggest that large majorities of people believe that they are better than 
average. That is, they believe they are more accomplished drivers than 
the average or that they will achieve a higher grade in a course than the 
average student. For listeners to National Public Radio, this is the “Lake 
Woebegone” phenomenon, where all children in the community are 
above average. Holding these beliefs does not mean only that one moves 
through life with a more positive outlook, but rather that decision-mak-
ing is potentially distorted. Such distortion in decision-making under 
uncertainty has been termed unrealistic optimism (Weinstein 1980). 
In the business context, overconﬁdence by top management (CEOs) 
has been associated with the wave of mergers that took place between 
1998 and 2001. During that period, about $2 trillion was spent on acqui-
sitions. Yet, shareholders of the acquiring companies lost about $250 
million as a result of those deals. This raises the question of why there 
was so much enthusiasm for mergers if the deals were unfavorable for the 
acquiring companies (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2003). 
In the context of a model of physician decision-making in which the 
physician is treated as a Bayesian information processor, the establish-
ment of priors and the updating of priors with new information may be 
subject to distortions by unrealistic optimism. 
Experimental research on optimism reveals that key among the charac-
teristics that explain the degree of unrealistic optimism are the desirability 
of the anticipated event, its perceived controllability, experience with the 
event, and the perceived probability of the event (Weinstein 1980). Research 
also shows that having detailed information on experiences of comparison 
groups attenuates, but does not eliminate, unrealistic optimism. 
Physicians are trained and function in environments that are consis-
tent with the conditions that breed unrealistic optimism. Because they 
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are trained to take control, physicians frequently believe that they have 
considerable ability to stave off the consequences of illness. Physicians 
are also charged with taking a central role in making decisions about life 
itself and about the ability of individuals to function and engage in basic 
human activity. Thus, the outcomes they aim to inﬂuence are highly emo-
tionally charged and valued by their patients. A physician has frequently 
dealt with particular cases on a number of occasions, in many cases with 
a positive outcome. Finally, it is seldom the case that physicians have 
detailed information on comparison groups to help them judge the likely 
incremental outcomes of their efforts. 
The consequences of unrealistic optimism in physician decision-mak-
ing may be several. First, physicians may have gained conﬁdence in 
their choices as they have received additional information about a case, 
even when their accuracy in, for example, making a diagnosis has been 
unchanged by the information (Oskamp 1965). Thus, optimism in the 
presence of clinical information will generate more testing and diagnostic 
procedures. Second, unrealistic optimism may make physicians overesti-
mate the expected beneﬁts from administering additional treatment—pos-
sibly because they overestimate both their own abilities and the potential 
impact of their preferred technologies. This can result in the provision of 
excessive levels of care. Finally, the physician may imbue patients with an 
overestimate of the beneﬁts of receiving more treatment. 
Data on the experience of caring for people at the end of life illustrate 
these possibilities and direct us towards hypotheses about optimism in 
medical care. The experience of patients at the end of life offers a disturb-
ing reﬂection of medical decision-making and resource allocation that 
reﬂects larger issues in health care delivery. Speciﬁcally, the majority of 
terminally ill patients state a preference to die at home, but frequently 
do not actually do so (Buntin and Huskamp 2002). Spending for care 
at the end of life accounts for a large share of Medicare expenditures, 
estimated at about 25 percent over the past two decades. There is con-
siderable disagreement regarding how much this level of spending can 
be reduced. However, Skinner and colleagues compare regions with the 
highest and lowest deciles of physician utilization during the last six 
months of life. They report utilization of diagnostic tests that differ by 
factors of between 2 and 3.5. In addition, they note differences in high-69 Richard G. Frank
intensity treatments (feeding tubes, dialysis, and ventilators) that differ 
by factors of 3 to 8 (Skinner, Fisher, and Wennberg 2001). These ﬁgures 
suggest potential for savings even if there are some differences in patient 
preferences across regions. Strikingly, patterns of end-of-life care do not 
vary substantially according to insurance arrangements (Experton et al. 
1997). Thus, spending levels and the ability to deliver care consonant 
with people’s preferences do not appear to be driven primarily by pay-
ment incentives. 
Unrealistic optimism appears to play a central role in clinical decision-
making at the end of life, as physicians tend to overestimate the duration 
of survival. Lamont and Christakis studied the prognostication abilities 
of physicians treating cancer patients in hospices (Lamont and Christakis 
2001). The median physician estimate of survival time was 75 days after 
admission to hospice, while the median actual survival time was 26 days. 
In addition, physicians then communicate more optimistic prognoses to 
patients than they actually believe. In the Lamont and Christakis study 
of cancer patients, for instance, physicians reported optimistic outlooks 
for patients to their colleagues about 12 percent of the time, whereas the 
same physicians reported optimistic outlooks to the same patients 41 
percent of the time (Christakis 1999). The true prognosis was communi-
cated to only 37 percent of the cancer patients. The unrealistic optimism 
potentially affects both the physician’s decisions about the therapies to 
pursue and the patient’s demand for care. Optimism has been posited to 
lead physicians to overprescribe intensive interventions aimed at cure, 
while under-referring to hospice (Lamont and Christakis 2001). Some 
research has observed that terminally ill patients who overestimate their 
expected survival time are far more likely to demand intensive “cura-
tive” care relative to palliative treatment (Weeks et al. 1998). Optimism 
therefore drives care towards high-intensity treatment that is unlikely to 
generate many clinical beneﬁts, and away from the use of hospice, an 
arrangement that may better serve the desires of well-informed patients. 
Unrealistic optimism is likely to be important in medical decision-
making in a range of other areas as well. It probably contributes to the 
emphasis on high-intensity medical care in the United States and for off-
frontier performance of the health care system. Clearly, other economic 
and professional inﬂuences are also at work in this case, but it is likely 
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that unrealistic optimism about technology and the ability to apply it 
have played a key role. Unrealistic optimism may result in a diminished 
response to P4P schemes, since physicians may be hard to convince that 
they are not currently doing “the right thing.” In addition, physicians 
may be resistant to schemes that “undervalue” their efforts. Corporate 
CEOs have responded in an analogous fashion when capital markets 
have tended to undervalue their investment and acquisition decisions. 
Complexity and the Limits to Supply-Side Fixes
Policymakers in the health sector have moved quickly in recent years to 
adopt measures that aim to address quality and cost problems by the 
implementation of P4P schemes  (Rosenthal et al. 2004). Under these 
arrangements, health plans implement various types of payments that 
reward achieving levels of performance on quality indicators (in some 
cases, performance is relative—for example, top 20 percent—in others, it 
is absolute). One health plan, for instance,  used data on physicians with 
respect to whether they screened for breast, cervical, and prostate cancer 
as well as for high cholesterol, and whether they managed diabetes and 
instituted other prevention programs. The plan paid $20 per patient to 
those doctors in the top quartile of performance, and $10 per patient 
to those between the 50th and 75th percentiles. Hundreds of such pay-
ment arrangements are being adopted around the country. The appeal 
is clear. Demand does appear to be very sensitive to quality or perfor-
mance differences. Prices of health care are generally administered so that 
higher-quality providers cannot charge more than others, and so there are 
incentives to underprovide quality if improvement is costly. Such schemes 
tend to assume that market participants (doctors and hospitals) exhibit a 
high level of economic rationality. 
Even standard economic models that assume rationality raise cautions 
regarding the enthusiasm for P4P schemes. Principal-agent models, for 
example, lead to concerns with multi-tasking or “teaching to the test,” 
whereby the outcomes upon which one pays will improve, while other 
outcomes that are valued but not well measured or not rewarded will 
be neglected and may decline. Recent research on P4P offers some evi-
dence to suggest that multitasking behavior takes place among physicians 
(Mullen, Frank, and Rosenthal 2007). Other institutional features and 71 Richard G. Frank
behavioral phenomena may also be important in determining the impact 
of P4P. 
The health care delivery system is very complex, with each provider 
typically serving 10 to 15 different public and private payers. Thus, 
payment methods, quality guidelines, level of care criteria, formularies, 
and coverage arrangements for patients will differ from payer to payer. 
Within each plan, payment arrangements are complicated, and the beneﬁt 
designs facing individual patients are typically highly nonlinear and fre-
quently dependent on prior treatment choices. This complexity requires 
that physicians be able to process large amounts of information in the 
context of strict time constraints to make optimizing choices. Recent the-
oretical and empirical analyses suggest, however, that the ability to do so 
may be quite limited. 
If we consider layering P4P schemes on top of existing payment sys-
tems—which for most physicians consist of mixes of capitation, fee for 
service, and case rates, and also frequently include productivity bonuses, 
pharmacy performance bonuses (sometimes related to generic prescrib-
ing), and some straight hourly payments for a set of 10 to 15 payers—the 
typical physician faces a very complicated price schedule. Liebman and 
Zeckhauser (2004) argue that complex price schedules have the potential 
to confuse physicians and patients and to increase the market power of 
the organizations establishing the pricing schemes. They postulate that 
people respond to the complexity in pricing schemes by adopting simple 
rules to govern behavior. The design of the pricing schemes in anticipa-
tion of the psychological response to the complexity is key to determining 
whether the pricing schemes enhance or harm social welfare. 
The health care system has had a variety of experiences with complex 
payment methods. A recent paper by Glied and Zivin (2002) examines 
physician behavior in the face of multiple incentive systems. They ﬁnd 
that observed physician behavior does not respond to the incentives asso-
ciated with the marginal patient in the way that simple proﬁt maximiza-
tion would predict. Instead, their empirical results show that the response 
to one category of incentives depends on the composition of payment 
schemes for other patients in their practice. This suggests an alternate 
rule to proﬁt maximization that governs response to supply behavior, 
such as a response to the modal incentives. During the 1980s, Medi-
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care and some state Medicaid programs instituted a hospital prospec-
tive payment system. That payment system had two parts: a prospective 
part that paid for an admission as stratiﬁed by diagnostic category and 
a part where supply-side cost sharing obtained after a speciﬁed level of 
spending was reached. Frank and Lave studied the effect of changing the 
payment system from cost-based reimbursement to per-case prospective 
payment for psychiatric care (Frank and Lave 1989). They showed that 
the response was a reduction in both long-stay and short-stay cases. The 
expected pattern was for a reduction in long-stay cases and an increased 
density of short-stay cases. Interviews with physicians suggested that they 
treated the prospective payment based on an average hospital stay for a 
case as if it were a target, and so the density of cases increased around 
the mean stay. 
The implication of these ideas and the experience with complex pay-
ment schemes is that, in a fragmented delivery system, P4P will not auto-
matically elicit the expected behavioral responses. Very little is known 
regarding the most effective design for such policies.
Conclusions
David Cutler’s work has stimulated health economists to think in differ-
ent ways about the performance of the health care delivery system. He 
emphasizes that assessing the performance of the health care delivery 
system is an empirical matter that requires careful and detailed analysis 
of spending and outcomes. The next step in that research program is to 
understand more about where we are relative to the efﬁciency frontier, 
and why. I have offered some examples of ideas that might be useful in 
putting behavioral economics to work on that task. This is a big job, but 
it is one that Cutler’s work clearly points to as unﬁnished business. 
Cutler’s call for P4P is well reasoned and sensible. However, whether 
one begins with the rational, money-oriented doctor or the optimistic per-
son with limited ability to respond effectively to complex economic envi-
ronments, theory will probably be of limited use in predicting responses 
to P4P schemes. Thus, Cutler suggests that some of these schemes be tried 
and that we begin to learn from these experiences. While I agree com-
pletely with that proposal, I also believe it is quite likely that the rational, 73 Richard G. Frank
money-oriented physician may not be the best starting place. If this is 
correct, then there are some useful implications from behavioral econom-
ics for how to design P4P schemes. I will conclude by mentioning three. 
First, use relatively simple payment schemes so that attention is easily 
focused on the key outcomes that will be rewarded. Second, implement 
these schemes on a large scale to diminish the complexity (number of 
payment schemes) and to increase the share of business affected, so that 
it pays to change. Finally, make the rewards large enough to overcome 
inertia, reluctance, and intrinsic motivational concerns. 
■ Richard G. Frank is grateful to David Cutler, Tom McGuire, and 
Jon Skinner for helpful discussion. Financial support from the AHRQ 
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Notes
1.  For a complete review of such issues, see Frank (2004).
2.  See National Expenditures at www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/default.asp 
(Accessed May, 2005).
References
Buntin, M. B. and H. Huskamp. 2002. What is known about the economics of 
end of life care for Medicare beneﬁciaries. The Gerontologist 42 (3): 40–48.
Christakis, N. A. 1999. Death Foretold: Prophecy and Prognosis in Medical 
Care. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce. 2007. The Budget and Economic Outlook, Fiscal 
Years 2008 to 2017. Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Budget Ofﬁce.
Cutler, D. M. 2004. Your Money or Your Life: Strong Medicine for America’s 
Health Care System. New York: Oxford University Press.
Experton, B., Z. Li, L. G. Branch, R. J. Ozminkowski, and D. M. Mellon-Lacey. 
1997. The impact of payor/provider type on the cost of dying among frail older 
adults. American Journal of Public Health 87 (2): 210–216.
Frank, R. G. 2004. Behavioral economics and health economics. NBER Working 
Paper No. 10881.
Frank, R. G. and J. R. Lave. 1989. A comparison of hospital responses to reim-
bursement for Medicaid psychiatric patients. RAND Journal of Economics 20 
(4): 588–600.
Deﬁning the Health Care Challenge 74
Glied, S. and J. G. Zivin. 2002. How do doctors behave when some (but not 
all) of their patients are in managed care. Journal of Health Economics 21 (2): 
337–353.
Haman, J., B. Langer, S. Leucht, R. Busch, and W. Kissling. 2004. Medical deci-
sion making in antipsychotic drug choice for schizophrenia. American Journal of 
Psychiatry 161 (7): 1301–1304.
Hartman, R. S., M. J. Doane, and C. K. Woo. 1991. Consumer rationality and 
the status quo. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1): 141–162.
Hellerstein, J. K. 1998. The importance of the physician in the generic   
versus trade-name prescription decision. RAND Journal of Economics 29 (1): 
108–136.
Institute of Medicine. 2001. Crossing the Quality Chasm. Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press.
Institute of Medicine. 2007. Rewarding Provider Performance: Aligning Incen-
tives in Medicare. Washington, D.C.: NAS Press.
Lamont, E. B. and N. A. Christakis. 2001. Prognostic disclosure to patients with 
cancer near the end of life. Annals of Internal Medicine 134 (12): 1096–1105.
Liebman, J. B. and R. J. Zeckhauser. 2004. Schmeduling. Working Paper, Ken-
nedy School of Government, Harvard University.
McGlynn, E. A., S. M. Asch, J. Adams, J. Keesey, J. Hicks, A. DeCristofaro, E. 
Kerr. 2003. The quality of health care delivered to adults in the United States. 
New England Journal of Medicine 348 (26): 2635–2645.
Moeller, S., F. Schlingemann, and R. Stulz. 2003. Do shareholders of acquiring 
ﬁrms gain from acquisitions? Research Technology Management 46 (6): 62–66.
Mullen, K. J., R. G. Frank, and M. B. Rosenthal. 2007. Can you get what you 
pay for? Pay for performance and the quality of health care providers. Working 
Paper, Harvard University.
Oskamp, S. 1965. Overconﬁdence in case study judgments. Journal of Consult-
ing Psychology 29 (3): 261–265.
Rosenthal, M. B., R. Fernandopulle, H. R. Song, and B. Landon. 2004. Paying 
for quality: Providers’ incentives for quality improvement. Health Affairs 23 (2): 
127–141.
Samuelson, W. and R. Zeckhauser. 1988. Status quo bias in decision making. 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 (1): 7–59.
Scherer, F. M. 2000. Pharmaceuticals. In Handbook of Health Economics, edited 
by Newhouse, J. P. and A. Culyer. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Skinner, J., E. S. Fisher, and J. E. Wennberg. 2001. The efﬁciency of Medicare. 
NBER Working Paper No. 8395.
Skinner, J. and D. O. Staiger. 2005. Technology adoption from hybrid corn to 
beta blockers. NBER Working Paper No. 11251.75 Richard G. Frank
Thaler, R. 1980. Towards a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organizations 39: 36–90.
Thorpe, K. E., C. S. Florence, and P. Joski. 2004. What medical conditions account 
for the rise in health care spending. Health Affairs, Web Exclusive. http://content.
healthaffairs.org/cgi/ reprint/hlthaff.w4.437v1.pdf. Accessed April 18, 2007.
Weeks, J. C., E. F. Cook, S. J. O’Day, L. M. Peterson, N. Wenger, D. Reding,   
F. E. Harrell, P. Kussin, N. V. Dawson, A. F. Connors, J. Lynn, and R. S. Phillips. 
1998. Relationship between cancer patients’ predictions of prognosis and their 
treatment preferences. Journal of the American Medical Association 279 (21): 
1709–1714.
Weinstein, N. D. 1980. Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 39 (5): 806–820.
Wennberg, J. E. and M. M. Cooper. 1997. Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. 
Chicago: American Hospital Publishing. Costs, Beneﬁts, and Rationing of Health 
Care: Comments on Cutler’s “What Is Good 
Care, and What Is Bad?”
William D. Nordhaus
A Very Hard Problem
To put health care in perspective, it is useful to consider some of the 
major economic problems facing the United States today. These include: 
(1) the budget deﬁcit, (2) global warming, (3) the current account deﬁcit, 
(4) Social Security, (5) dependence on imported oil, and (6) health care. 
After some study, I believe that we could fashion a reasonable solution 
that would resolve the ﬁrst ﬁve problems, at low cost and with relatively 
little inequity and economic dislocation. 
For the sixth one, health care, I do not believe that an obvious solution 
exists. Henry Aaron called health care “the problem that won’t go away.” 
I wonder whether it is the problem that cannot be solved, or that cannot 
be solved in a simple and efﬁcient way. This is perhaps the message of 
the papers prepared for this conference by David Cutler, Alain Enthoven, 
and Henry Aaron; it is the message from the dozens of presentations and 
papers I have read over the years. Most experts believe that they have a 
solution to the American health care problem—whether this-or-that kind 
of competition or this-or-that kind of payer—but it is not obvious to me 
that any of these plans will actually resolve the problems of the American 
health care system today. 
What are the barriers to ﬁxing health care? There are many, but some 
that seem particularly important to me are the following. First, the eco-
nomic stakes are huge in terms of the incomes of the providers (doctors, 
insurance companies, lobbyists, and the rest).1 Health care is too large to 
tuck into an omnibus bill. Second, the welfare stakes are enormous for 
patients. People have beneﬁted greatly from improved medical care, and 
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they, particularly the elderly, see health care as a basic right. Reducing 
beneﬁts or entitlements among powerful groups will not be easy. Third, 
medical care is seen as a special kind of good and not as a normal eco-
nomic good. The idea that medical care should be “rationed” the way we 
ration food, shelter, and automobiles is unacceptable not only to patients 
but also to many physicians. Clearly, some kind of rationing must occur, 
and the major questions are how it will be done, who are the losers and 
winners, and whether it will be efﬁcient or inefﬁcient. 
The Costs of Health Care
Our economy has a very large stake in both the costs and the beneﬁts of 
our health care system. I will begin with the familiar terrain of the share 
of health spending in the economy. There are clearly some ambiguities in 
estimates of spending on health care, such as whether to include spend-
ing on research and development, the environment, automobile and mine 
safety, and even health economists’ salaries. Standard estimates from the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) indicate that the 
share of health expenditures rose from 8.8 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 1980 to 15.3 percent in 2003. 
Figure 3.5 shows the share of medical care in personal consumption 
expenditures (PCE), with a share under 4 percent up to around 1950, 
then rising sharply to 17 percent of PCE in 2004. The share of health in 
government direct purchases (which exclude transfer payments), shown 
in Figure 3.6, has been stable at between 4 and 6 percent of the total. Fig-
ure 3.7 shows the estimated relative inﬂation rate of health care, accord-
ing to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), compared with all 
personal consumption expenditures. Health care prices have been rising 
more rapidly than all prices by about 1 percent per year, although it is 
quite likely that medical care inﬂation has been overestimated because of 
measurement issues.
The Beneﬁts of Improved Health
On the beneﬁt side, there is evidence that the improvements in health 
status over the last century have caused substantial improvements to eco-79 William D. Nordhaus
Figure 3.5
Medical Care as a Share of Personal Consumption Expenditures
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nomic welfare. This result emerges from several studies that value health 
improvements at conventional values of life extension. Studies by David 
Cutler and Elizabeth Richardson, as well as by Kevin Murphy, Robert 
Topel, and myself, have examined the economic equivalent of the exten-
sions to life saving.2
My own conclusion from this exercise, based only on changes in life 
expectancy, was that the value of improvements in life expectancy is 
about as large as the value of improvements in all other consumption 
goods and services put together. Figure 3.8 shows an illustrative calcu-
lation from my study on “The Health of Nations” (Nordhaus 2003). 
This demonstrates that the growth of income from health improvements 
(shown as the ﬁrst three bars in each group) is about as large as the 
growth in conventionally measured incomes.
Over the period from 1975 to 2000, for example, conventionally mea-
sured per capita income grew at an average rate of 2.0 percent per year. 
Over this same period, the annual average improvements in life expectancy 
had an economic value of between 1.0 and 2.1 percent of income (depend-
ing upon the discount rate and other assumptions).3 Over the entire period 
Figure 3.7 
Relative Inﬂation of Medical Care to All Personal Consumption Expenditures 
(Three-Year Moving Average)
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from 1900 to 2000, the value of improved health or health income grew 
at between 1.2 and 2.5 percent of consumption (again depending upon 
the exact assumptions), whereas income grew at a rate of about 2.0 per-
cent of consumption. Looking at the entire twentieth century, the contri-
bution of the increase in life expectancy was between 59 percent and 126 
percent of the contribution of income from all sources combined. 
Speciﬁc Egalitarianism and the Need for Rationing
Among the public and many health care practitioners, it is widely accepted 
that everyone has a right to basic medical care. In a recent survey, 84 
percent of respondents agreed that, “Health care should be provided 
equally to everyone, just as public education is” (Kaiser Family Founda-
tion 2004). This strong sentiment is usually tempered by concerns about 
costs and restrictions to access. However, with respect to health care, it is 
striking how many people believe in “speciﬁc egalitarianism,” meaning 
Figure 3.8
Growth in Health Income and Conventional Income, 1900–2000
Growth in health income is equal to the change in the value of improved health 
status divided by income and is shown for three different annual discount rates. 
The fourth bar shows the growth in per capita income. All ﬁgures are annual 
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that speciﬁc programs or services should be distributed “equally” among 
all people. Some examples of this include the vote for citizens, the draft 
in time of major wars, as well as primary and secondary public schooling 
among children.
While there is general agreement that basic health care should be uni-
versally provided, this poses serious economic issues. First, as James 
Tobin pointed out, speciﬁc egalitarianism can be used most efﬁciently 
when goods are inelastic in supply.4 We do not worry (with the obvi-
ous exceptions) about inefﬁciencies in the “production” of votes in pro-
claiming “one person, one vote.” Similarly, there has generally been but 
a small response in the supply of citizens to the presence of a universal 
military service in most countries. By contrast, because much of health 
care is elastic in supply, particularly in the long run, mandating equal 
provision is likely to lead to major inefﬁciencies. 
Two polar examples can serve to illustrate this point about elasticity. 
First, there is little in the health care sector that is truly ﬁxed in supply in 
the long run (in the sense of being completely price inelastic). Perhaps the 
supply of organs for transplantation comes close to ﬁxed supply. If these 
organs are allocated purely based on medical need, then the absence of 
a market signal will not reduce the number available and will not keep 
transplants from those who need them. If we desire speciﬁc egalitari-
anism, a parallel market in this case would be harmful. If a market in 
organs is allowed, those with higher incomes can bid some of the ﬁxed 
supply away from those who need them most. This is one example where 
the Canadian model of prohibiting a private market to run in parallel to 
the comprehensive public system can be justiﬁed.
The opposite, however, would hold for medical drugs, the second polar 
example. Suppose that the government system includes payments for an 
expensive drug like Taxol for treatment of cancer. Like the majority of 
manufactured products, most drugs are close to perfectly elastic in supply 
(and may even have some positive learning effects). In this case, it would 
not be sensible to prohibit a parallel private market, because there is no 
crowding out of the public supply by increased private demand. 
A second difﬁculty with speciﬁc egalitarianism in health is the deﬁni-
tion of the bundle of goods to which equality should apply. Many people 
would agree that access to medical care for a life-threatening illness, such 
as a ruptured spleen or tuberculosis, should not be denied to anyone. 83 William D. Nordhaus
However, it is not clear that people would agree that everyone should 
have free and immediate treatment for removal of corns and calluses. 
Where to “draw the line” is a vexing problem—one that will not go away 
and indeed is likely to worsen as more conditions are classiﬁed and more 
treatments are discovered.
One of the results of poorly designed speciﬁc egalitarianism is the gen-
eral view among health care experts that the allocation of health care in 
the United States is highly inefﬁcient. The general view, expressed differ-
ently in the papers by Cutler, Enthoven, and Aaron, is that many criti-
cal conditions are untreated, while others with high costs and close to 
zero medical beneﬁts are receiving substantial resources. Although this is 
self-evident to specialists, it is also a very difﬁcult research issue. David 
Cutler’s presentation showed a number of illnesses for which the beneﬁt-
cost ratios for some treatments are quite high (cardiovascular disease, 
heart attack, low-birth-weight infants, and depression), with some sug-
gestions of areas where the beneﬁt-cost ratio may be low (such as Sal’s 
angioplasty). More than one-third of Medicaid spending goes to long-
term care, and it is not clear that this qualiﬁes as a high-beneﬁt activity. 
It would be interesting to see whether a more comprehensive approach 
could be taken, using a nationally representative sample that matches 
treatments and conditions, to ﬂesh out the larger picture.
Whether or not a country provides equal health care for all its resi-
dents, there must be rationing of health care. While rationing might be a 
jarring word, it reﬂects the reality that, in a world of scarcity, every need 
and desire cannot be fully satisﬁed. Until we get to the point where every 
symptom of every hypochondriac can be extensively examined, probed, 
tested, and treated, it will be necessary to leave some perceived medical 
need unsatisﬁed. Rationing is not an option. However, it is not obvious 
how we are to ration.
Most goods and services are rationed by the purse. Prices ration out 
the limited supply of fancy cars and mansions, as well as not-so-fancy 
gasoline and land, to those whose incomes and tastes lead them to want 
them most. In many areas of health care, we do not allow prices to ration 
out services to the highest bidders. The results are sometimes longer waits 
for care as a surrogate price (as is the complaint in many HMOs and in 
Canada), rising expenditures as the demand for services rises sharply (as 
for Medicaid and Medicare), or lack of coverage (for the rising number 
Deﬁning the Health Care Challenge 84
of uninsured). One way of interpreting the ﬁscal crisis facing the United 
States is that the country is unwilling to ration health resources by price 
or by trimming the beneﬁt package.
So long as we continue to seek some form of speciﬁc egalitarianism 
in health care, there will be no easy solutions to the rationing problem. 
For my tastes, I would prefer some type of explicit selection of covered 
beneﬁts along the lines of the Oregon prioritized list of covered ser-
vices. The philosophy of the Oregon plan is that all citizens should have 
access to care, and that there should be an open and reasoned process 
for determining the list of covered treatments. One initial component of 
the ranking of the prioritized list was a cost-beneﬁt test, although that 
appears to have generated such disagreement that it was either dropped 
or demoted in favor of cost-effectiveness tests together with expert and 
public views.5
While not without shortcomings, this approach has several attractive 
features. First, it does allow a budget constraint to operate in the sense 
that a “line” can be drawn to ﬁt treatments into available resources. So, 
for example, the funding line in 2004 just included simple and social 
phobias and just excluded acute conjunctivitis.
Second, while we might complain about the priorities, there appears 
to be little disagreement about the general rankings. Treatment of dia-
betes and appendicitis are covered, and few would probably disagree 
here. Below the line are elective dental services and several conditions for 
which there are either no effective treatments or no necessary treatments. 
There are also some brave exclusions, such as the decision not to treat 
cancers with ﬁve-year survival probabilities of less than 5 percent.6 
It would be useful to have more study about the implicit valuations of 
different conditions along with treatment costs for the prioritized list to 
see whether, in fact, the cost-beneﬁt calculations are reasonable. It would 
also be interesting to compare the cost-beneﬁt calculations in the health 
care arena with those that have been done for environmental, health, and 
safety regulations. As Table 3.2 shows, results in the regulatory area indi-
cate extremely disparate cost-beneﬁt ratios, depending upon the regulation 
and agency. The regulations shown here range from highly cost-beneﬁcial 
with large beneﬁts and negligible costs (for the tobacco regulations for 
youths) to others where the costs per fatality prevented are in the billions 85 William D. Nordhaus
Table 3.2
Estimates of Cost of Life Saved by Major Federal Regulations
Rule (Agency)
Net cost per  
discounted life  
(millions of 1995 $)
Source: Hahn, Lutter, and Viscusi (2000, pp. 16–17).
Toxicity characteristics to determine hazardous wastes (EPA)
Underground storage tanks: technical requirements (EPA)
Manufactured home construction standards on wind (HUD)
Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals  
 (DOL)
Regulations of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco for youths  
 (HHS)
Medicare and Medicaid programs, miscellaneous (HHS)
Quality mammography standards (HHS)
Food labeling regulations (HHS)
Childproof lighters (CPSC)
Standard for occupational exposure to benzene (DOL)
Occupational exposure to methylene chloride (DOL)
Occupational exposure to 4,4a methylenedianiline (DOL)
Asbestos prohibitions, total (EPA)
National primary and secondary water regulations— 
  phase II (EPA)
Occupational exposure to asbestos (DOL)
Hazardous waste management system—wood preservatives  
 (EPA)
Sewage sludge use and disposal regulations, 40 CFR pt. 503  
 (EPA)
Land disposal restrictions for “third third” scheduled wastes  
 (EPA)
Hazardous waste management system, solvents (EPA)
Occupational exposure to formaldehyde (DOL)
Prohibit the land disposal of the ﬁrst third of scheduled wastes  
 (EPA)
Land disposal restrictions—phase II (EPA)
Drinking water regulations, synthetic organic chemicals— 
  phase V (EPA)
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of dollars (such as some drinking water regulations). Are cost-beneﬁt 
ratios also this disparate under current programs like Medicare and Med-
icaid, and in current HMO and insurance beneﬁt packages?
Third, a prioritized list, in principle, allows adjustments of treatments 
and coverages in response to changes in medical technology and clinical 
studies. One of the major difﬁculties with most approaches to coverage 
is “contractual stickiness,” whereby beneﬁts are easy to add but difﬁ-
cult to remove.7 A prioritized list provides a mechanism for adding and 
removing services that legitimizes the process rather than politicizing the 
process from the very start. In this arena, the process of changing the list 
cannot be an easy one, any more than weaning people from their SUVs 
by high gasoline prices is painless in a market arena. Still, we clearly need 
mechanisms to substitute for a market mechanism when we decide, as in 
much of health care, not to allow the price mechanism to operate.
A prioritized list is not the only mechanism for selecting covered ser-
vices, however. Every HMO and insurance contract must somehow make 
similar choices all the time. One major advantage of the prioritized-list 
approach is that, in principle, it uses a cost-beneﬁt philosophy (rank-
ing on the basis of the beneﬁt-cost ratio) rather than a medical necessity 
philosophy (whereby procedures are included if their proven beneﬁts are 
positive) or the results of litigation (whereby something is included to 
prevent legal action). Perhaps the most important advantage is that by 
excluding medical services that are low priority, particularly those that 
receive public funding, we make room for extending high-priority ser-
vices to those who currently do not qualify or who are crowded out by 
market or bureaucratic forces.
Notes
1. This point was amply shown in an insightful set of essays in Aaron and   
Armacost (1995).
2. See particularly Cutler and Richardson (1997), and the chapters by William 
D. Nordhaus, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel, and David M. Cutler and 
Srikanth Kadiyala in Murphy and Topel (2003).
3.  The single most important assumption in these studies is the value of extend-
ing the lifespan by a year. Most studies, including my own, value a life-year at 
around $100,000 per year, or $12 per hour, at income levels of the 1990s.87 William D. Nordhaus
4.  Tobin (1970). Tobin discusses several policies that are good targets for speciﬁc 
egalitarianism.
5.  A description and the list are available at http://egov.oregon.gov/DAS/OHPPR/
HSC/current_prior.shtml. A particularly useful discussion is by Bodenheimer 
(1997a, 1997b). 
6.  This is an interesting calculation for those in health economics. Assuming that 
the value of one year of life extension is $100,000, then the value of such pro-
cedures would be less than .05 × 5 × $100,000 = $25,000. The cost of a course 
of treatment is probably in the same order of magnitude as the upper limit of 
beneﬁt, so this seems reasonably well grounded in the underlying cost-beneﬁt 
calculation.
7. Contractual stickiness is the health care analog to downward wage rigid-
ity that macroeconomists analyze in such detail. The two syndromes arise 
from the same underlying source, the costs of negotiating changes to existing   
understandings.
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